![]() ![]() The Commission orders ERCOT to correct that problem manually, setting prices to $9000 per megawatt-hour in hopes of encouraging more supply to come online. Most of the state is now under a blackout.Ī number of methane gas processing facilities, which failed to register as critical infrastructure, also lose power, increasing the difficulty of getting the gas to power plants.Ī computer glitch leads megawatts to be taken off of the grid due to incorrect price signals. 3.6 million homes and businesses are without power by Monday evening. ERCOT orders more and more load shedding until supply and demand are finally brought into balance. Areas designated as “critical” (for example hospitals) are left alone while other neighborhoods lose power. ![]() Starting just after 1 am, ERCOT starts ordering electric companies around the state to cut power (called “load shedding”) to homes and businesses in order to prevent a complete shutdown of the entire grid. President Biden grants Texas a Federal Emergency Declaration at Governor Abbott’s request. ![]() on February 14.”ĮRCOT warns of possible rolling outages through Tuesday, the 16th. Unplanned generating unit outages escalate “sharply in the late-night hours of February 14 into the early morning hours of February 15, and ERCOT set an all-time winter peak record for system load of 69,871 MW at 8:00 p.m. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) projects electricity demand will exceed available supply, and issues an urgent conservation alert. With no place to send gas, producing wells instead vent or flare it – 1.6 billion cubic feet of methane (a powerful greenhouse gas) in a single day.ĭemand for electricity and gas surges as people turn up their heaters. Dozens of wind turbines stop as ice forms around blades. The weather also takes coal and nuclear generators offline as lines, valves, and other equipment freeze. The supply shortage problem is compounded when equipment at the power plants also freezes. Gas power plants do not have enough methane gas to meet demand. Ultimately 38 gas plants shut down or reduce production, equivalent to 8.9 billion cubic feet per day of lost gas processing plant capacity. The Railroad Commission (the state’s oil and gas regulator) orders gas deliveries be prioritized for homes – good news for the 40% of Texas homes heated with gas, but not so good, as we’ll see, for the 60% of homes heated with electricity.Ĭold weather disrupts 22 gas processing plants. The Texas Division of Emergency Management begins to deploy multiple state agencies to support response operations. Governor Abbott issues a disaster declaration in every one of Texas’ 254 counties. Icy roads in Fort Worth lead to a 133 car pile-up and six deaths. School districts begin to issue closure announcements in preparation for the storm. Gas production in Texas ultimately drops by 45%. These freeze-offs at the wellhead lead gas production to plummet – days before anybody loses power. The cold temperatures freeze water in oil and gas wells (when extracted, the methane gas used in power plants and for home use comes up the well with water and other liquids). As the anniversary of Uri approaches, it’s important to remember exactly what caused the deadly blackouts and what has, and hasn’t been done, to fix the grid. Here’s a day by day review of how the disaster unfolded.Įlectric utility crews are put on standby around the state as weather forecasts project an extreme winter storm. In early February 2021, Winter Storm Uri hit Texas and crippled the state as temperatures dropped to as low as six degrees.
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